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ABSTRACT
The literature on belief systems in mass publics shows that survey respondents
typically have diﬃculty in describing their images of political parties; only about
half oﬀer a meaningful description of how they see individual parties. This paper
investigates what people in Northern Ireland think that parties stand for in their
home jurisdiction, in Great Britain and in the Republic of Ireland, using open-
ended questions in a survey of 1,008 Northern Ireland residents. Northern
Ireland respondents resemble those elsewhere, in that only about half seem
able to oﬀer a politically meaningful description of what local parties stand
for. Among the more politically sophisticated, the Northern Ireland parties are
described in ethnonational terms, the British parties are placed in socio-
economic (social class and left-right) categories, but few respondents know
how to describe the parties in the Republic of Ireland. There is an intriguing
asymmetry in the characterization of Northern Ireland’s unionist and
nationalist parties: the DUP emerges as only marginally more ‘hard-line’ than
the UUP, whereas a great gulf exists between the SDLP and Sinn Féin, the
former being perceived as much more moderate. Notwithstanding high levels
of electoral stability in Northern Ireland, our ﬁndings show that party
supporters vary greatly in their levels of political sophistication, perhaps
allowing elites greater freedom of action than if all voters were highly
politically informed.
KEYWORDS Northern Ireland; Great Britain; Ireland; ideology; party image; mass public
Introduction
The very ﬁrst issue of this journal contained an important article on ‘party
images’ regarding Northern Ireland policy among parliamentarians in the
Republic (Sinnott, 1986). More than three decades later, we report here on
a new survey that looks at party images from a diﬀerent perspective, that
of the Northern Ireland electorate. This dataset permits us to link empirical
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT John Coakley j.coakley@qub.ac.uk
IRISH POLITICAL STUDIES
https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2018.1499621
ﬁndings regarding Northern Ireland to a broader literature on the belief
systems of mass publics, in particular that of party images. Public perceptions
of parties in Northern Ireland may now be probed in a fuller way than has
been possible since the landmark study of the older party system in 1968
(Rose, 1971). The topic is important, not least because people’s images of
the parties constrain party leaders in their eﬀorts ‘to structure political
conﬂict’ (Sanders, 1988, p. 583).
We begin by outlining the research domain in which empirical ﬁndings on
party images may be situated. The general literature on party images in mass
publics facilitates the derivation of expectations of how respondents are likely
to view the parties. Our methods and principal results are then presented,
focusing on the ideological lens through which Northern Ireland respondents
appear to view local parties within Northern Ireland, but also on how they
view the main parties in Great Britain and in the Republic of Ireland. The con-
clusion reﬂects on the implications for our understanding of the formation of
party images in contemporary Northern Ireland, but also for the literature on
party images more generally.
Party images in previous literature
Research on the public’s images of political parties and political ﬁgures began
in the 1960s, notably in the seminal American Voter study. This approach dis-
tinguished four broad levels of conceptualization in the belief systems of mass
publics (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, pp. 218–250), generating
an enduring framework that has been widely used subsequently (for impor-
tant examples, see Nie, Verba, & Petrocik, 1976, pp. 110–116; Klingemann,
1979, pp. 219–232; Klingemann & Wattenberg, 1992, pp. 137–142; Watten-
berg, 1982, pp. 29–38; Konda & Sigelman, 1987, pp. 815–820; Smith, 1980,
p. 696; Smith, 1989, pp. 223–227; Luskin, 1987, p. 856; Cassel, 1984, p. 428;
Knight, 1985, p. 832; Lewis-Beck, Norpoth, & Jacoby, 2009, p. 279; Converse,
2007, p. 155; and Kuklinski & Peyton, 2007, p. 61). The four levels into which
this scholarly corpus has divided the public are as follows (Converse, 1964).
(A) ideologues, who rely on ‘a relatively abstract and far-reaching conceptual
dimension’ in evaluating political objects, grouped with near-ideologues,
who appear to recognize such a dimension but place little reliance on it;
(B) ‘group interest’ respondents, who show no consciousness of any such
dimension but evaluate candidates or parties by reference to ‘their
expected favorable or unfavorable treatment of diﬀerent social groupings’;
(C) ‘nature of the times’ respondents, who show little appreciation of any
policy dimension but associate parties or candidates with particular
good or bad times, or evaluate them by reference to purely personal
matters; and
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(D) respondents displaying ‘no issue content’, who show no policy conscious-
ness whatsoever, who have no idea what a particular party stands for, or
who simply do not respond.
We have investigated the extent to which, in evaluating their parties,
Northern Ireland respondents may be classiﬁed in respect of this typology.
The institutionalization of parties in Northern Ireland since the Belfast or
Good Friday Agreement of 1998 gives this question particular importance,
and raises further questions related to the deeply divided status of the
region, the decades of civil unrest it has experienced, and the volatile
implementation over the past two decades of a consociational system.
According to its critics, the consociational institutions reinforce the underlying
division between unionists and nationalists; according to its supporters, this
settlement recognizes and accommodates deep divisions that are historically
entrenched (see Taylor, 2009, for the various positions, and O’Leary, 2019, for a
detailed treatment). There are also reasons to suspect that other political
themes may play a signiﬁcant role in contemporary Northern Ireland, and
may even signal an emergent ‘normalization’ of politics. Economic left-right
issues have sparked signiﬁcant political debate, especially in the early
twenty-ﬁrst century, including tensions over welfare ‘reform’ (code for auster-
ity according to critics). Moral-religious issues – for example, laws relating to
gay rights and abortion – have also been salient (Garry, Matthews, & Wheatley,
2017; Tonge & Evans, 2015). Strikingly, it was ostensibly over a ‘bread and
butter’ administrative question, a renewable heating initiative that raised
questions of corruption and competence, that the power-sharing executive
collapsed in January 2017 (McGuinness, 2017).
In assessing the level of ideological sophistication and the extent to which
other policy dimensions may cut across the ethnonational cleavage, we asked
respondents in a representative survey what they thought, in their own words,
each party ‘stands for’. This could have elicited several responses. Would they
simply describe the parties in ethnonational terms, with the unionist parties
characterized as standing for British unionism (and cultural Protestantism),
and the nationalist parties standing for Irish nationalism (and cultural Catholi-
cism)? Insofar as people do not characterize the parties in an ethnonational
manner, would they view them through an economic or a moral-religious
prism? Would many respondents perhaps have no idea what the parties
stand for, as the American and comparative research cited above suggests
may be the case for a large segment of respondents in contemporary democ-
racies? And how would respondents evaluate the parties in the neighbouring
jurisdictions of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland?
Our analysis is novel in two respects. First, we made no initial assumption
about the sophistication of respondents and the dominance of ethnonation-
alist values, but simply allowed our sample to express, in open-ended form,
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what they thought each of the parties in the system stood for (to our knowl-
edge, the sole occasion on which this was previously done in Northern Ireland,
was in 1968; see Rose, 1971). We avoided presuming that the political system
is Northern Ireland is overwhelmingly ethnonational. When given a chance to
express the images they have of the parties, if respondents characterized
them in non-ethnonational terms (for example, by reference to the economic,
moral-religious or other dimensions) that would provide evidence of the
development of what is often – albeit misleadingly – referred to as ‘normal’
politics. Second, as well as assessing respondents’ characterizations of North-
ern Ireland parties we asked them to characterize parties from the associated
polities of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. This extension allowed us
to probe the attitudes of Northern Ireland respondents further: if they
described Northern Ireland parties in ethnonational terms, would they
describe the British and Irish parties through the same thematic lens, or by
reference to other criteria, such as economic or moral-religious categoriz-
ations? To what extent would their images of these ‘external’ parties be
diﬀuse, unclear or perhaps even non-existent?
Perspectives on parties
Northern Ireland’s parties are typically characterized as competing in dis-
tinct blocs (Mitchell, 1991). In the unionist or Protestant bloc, observers
generally see the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) as more adamantly
unionist than the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). The latter’s leaders played
a central role in negotiating the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement
which established power sharing, while until 2007 the former was formally
opposed to that agreement and to sharing power with republicans. Since
the 2003 Assembly election the DUP has overshadowed the UUP as the
electorally dominant unionist party, and, shortly after the St Andrews
Agreement of 2006, the party’s founder, the Reverend Ian Paisley,
brought the DUP into government with Sinn Féin, sharing the dual premier-
ship with former IRA commander Martin McGuinness. In the nationalist bloc
the more hard-line party also displaced the more moderate party from
group leadership in the 2003 Assembly election, completing the ascen-
dancy of tribune parties in both blocs (Mitchell, Evans, & O’Leary, 2009).
The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) had a long track-record
of supporting power-sharing, though Sinn Féin has moved a long way
from its former support for the IRA, and insistence on a complete British
withdrawal from Northern Ireland. It embraced the 1998 Agreement and
pragmatically acknowledged Northern Ireland as part of the UK (as long
as a majority consent to that status).
Some might have expected these ideological trajectories to have a big
impact on perceptions of the parties. Insofar as voters characterize parties
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in ethnonational terms, the DUP and UUP would be expected to be seen as
representing the interests of Protestants and pursuing a unionist agenda,
with the former likely to be characterized as more forceful than the latter. Like-
wise, we would expect that Sinn Féin and the SDLP would be seen as repre-
senting Catholics and pursuing a nationalist ideological agenda, with the
former seen as more vigorously nationalist.
In contrast to the main unionist and nationalist parties, the Alliance Party
characterizes itself as a cross-community party, and its Assembly members
do not self-designate as either ‘nationalist’ or ‘unionist’ – the labelling intro-
duced in 1998 to facilitate consociational voting arrangements in the Assem-
bly. Alliance MLAs designate as ‘other’.1 Thus, we might have expected that
our respondents would see Alliance as rejecting the politics of the two
main blocs and as seeking to represent Catholics and Protestants equally,
steering a middle path between nationalism and unionism – in short, as a
party that deﬁnes itself by reference to its ‘centrist position’ on the ethnona-
tional dimension.
If social class and economic ideology play a role in determining respon-
dents’ perceptions of the parties, it was reasonable to expect, especially
given the ‘outsider’ origins of the party, that the DUP would be seen as
more likely to represent the working class, with the UUP more likely to be
seen as middle-class. Similarly, research has previously shown that the SDLP
has a more middle-class support base than Sinn Féin.2 At the level of econ-
omic ideas, a candidate study in 2003 by Gilland-Lutz and Farrington
(2006), and an expert survey by Benoit and Laver (2006) focused on the
same period, painted a fairly similar picture of Northern Ireland parties’ econ-
omic policy positions: Sinn Féin is the most ‘left-wing’ and the UUP the most
‘right-wing, with the three remaining parties – the DUP, the SDLP and the Alli-
ance Party – clustered around the centre ground.
It was possible that in recent years the parties’ positions (and particularly
that of the DUP) had both adjusted to new institutional realities and had
become more evident to our respondents. Most notably, since 2012 the
Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly have been clearly divided over
the implementation of welfare cuts introduced by the British government.
Notwithstanding its origins as an anti-establishment party, the DUP has
adopted a ﬁrm ‘balance the books’ stance, while Sinn Féin has advocated a
staunchly left-wing position, refusing to implement retrenchment and
vetoing the budget. The main parties, along with the British and Irish govern-
ments, have participated in several high-proﬁle initiatives to resolve their
diﬀerences, the most substantial of which resulted in the 2014 Stormont
House Agreement (Coakley, 2018, pp. 341–342). The question of welfare
and the parties’ diﬀering stances on how best to address beneﬁts have
been consistent and dominant features of political news coverage since 2012.
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Moral issues have also dominated the media at times in recent years,
especially relating to Northern Ireland’s exceptional legislative stance on abor-
tion compared to other constituent parts of the UK, and on issues related to
gay rights, notably that of same-sex marriage (see Tonge & Evans, 2015, pp.
128–131). Previous studies of party positions by Gilland-Lutz and Farrington
(2006) and Benoit and Laver (2006) showed that on moral-religious issues
the local parties occupy distinct positions: Sinn Féin and Alliance are the
two most liberal parties on these questions, the UUP and SDLP occupy the
middle ground, and the DUP is the most conservative on moral-religious
matters.
As well as the parties which contest elections to the Assembly, Northern
Ireland voters operate within a wider UK framework, participating in elections
to the Westminster parliament, so the positions of the main British parties are
also of relevance. The British Labour party has traditionally refused to contest
Northern Ireland elections, arguing that Labour is already represented there
by its ‘sister’ party in the Socialist International, the SDLP, whose MPs normally
accepted the Labour whip at Westminster. By contrast, the Conservatives had
a close link with the Ulster Unionist Party dating back to the nineteenth
century, a relationship that broke down in 1972 when the Conservative gov-
ernment suspended Northern Ireland’s original devolved (but entirely unionist
controlled) institutions. The links ended formally only in 1986, when the UUP
cut its ﬁnal ties in vehement opposition to the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement,
and the Conservatives began to organize in Northern Ireland (O’Leary &
McGarry, 1993, pp. 255–256). The party subsequently contested elections in
Northern Ireland, but so far has not won a seat in the Assembly (see Garry,
2016, pp. 64–83).3
Since constitutional debate in Northern Ireland focuses not just on the
region’s current membership of the United Kingdom but also its possible
future membership of a united Ireland, and given that Irish governments
retain institutional roles in the workings of the 1998 Agreement, the local
evaluation of the main Irish parties also needs to be considered. While a
number of smaller parties, including People before Proﬁt, operate on an all-
Ireland basis, only one major party, Sinn Féin, does so. As a party whose
primary stated goal is Irish unity, this is not, perhaps, surprising; but it is sig-
niﬁcant that the other three main Irish parties, each of which formally sup-
ports Irish unity, only contest elections on the southern side of the border.
Fine Gael has never intervened electorally in Northern Ireland. The Irish
Labour party has been reluctant to compete in Northern Irish elections, not-
withstanding some mid-twentieth century interventions in Belfast. Fianna
Fáil has declared its intention to compete in Northern Ireland elections
from 2019, but has not put forward candidates in elections there at any
level since 1933 (see Garry, 2016, pp. 64–83).4
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It was therefore reasonable to expect that respondents in Northern Ireland
would have opinions on those external British or Irish parties which intervene,
or might intervene, in elections there. The traditional association of Conserva-
tives with unionism and of Labour as more likely to empathize with national-
ism is well known (Cunningham, 2001), and might have been expected to
feature in perceptions of these parties, alongside the very obvious divisions
between them on matters of socio-economic policy. Unlike the main British
parties, the largest Irish parties are not generally regarded as particularly ideo-
logically distinct from one another (Cunningham & Marsh, 2018; Weeks, 2018).
Even well-informed Irish voters have diﬃculty in discerning major diﬀerences
on economic policy, though there are reasonably clear diﬀerences on moral-
religious matters between the typically quite liberal Labour party and the tra-
ditionally more conservative Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael parties. For this reason,
we might expect Northern Ireland survey respondents to have even greater
diﬃculty in distinguishing between these parties.
Comparison across polities enables us to address whether there is a generic
or conditional characterization of parties in ethnonational terms. Is the ethno-
national division so deeply embedded in Northern Ireland that parties there
and in linked polities are characterized in either unionist or nationalist
terms? Or perhaps ethnonational factors have pre-eminence in Northern
Ireland, but Northern Ireland respondents are fully able to discern the primar-
ily non-ethnonational nature of party stances in Great Britain and the Republic
of Ireland? Another possibility is that ethnonational factors are largely irrele-
vant in linked polities, and that they are only partially relevant in Northern
Ireland, with other themes playing a strong role in framing how respondents
see the parties. Our aim was to confront these diﬀerent possible interpret-
ations with reliable and relevant data. Let us explain ﬁrst how we generated
the data.
Measuring party images
When survey-based investigation of party images was at its height in the
1950s and 1960s, researchers used two broad approaches: an open-ended
one, where respondents were asked what they liked and disliked about
speciﬁc parties, or what they saw those parties as standing for, and a closed
approach, where they were asked to rate parties regarding speciﬁc issue
dimensions (Denver, Carman, & Johns, 2012, p. 131). Since our object was
to cast our net wide and to collect respondents’ descriptions of parties in
an open-ended, unframed and unprompted manner, the open-ended
approach was the more appropriate: respondents were invited to describe
in their own words their images not only of their own local parties but also
of those in Great Britain and in the Republic of Ireland.
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The Northern Ireland party system oﬀers a particularly attractive laboratory
for examining the role played by party images. When the most recent civil
unrest was in its infancy, the founding father of survey research across North-
ern Ireland, Richard Rose (1971, p. 218), pointed out that it had ‘a society in
which party loyalties reinforce discord rather than allegiance to the
regime’.5 His path-breaking ‘Loyalty survey’ in mid-1968, of exceptional
value as a baseline of public attitudes before the outbreak of sustained
conﬂict, investigated images of the three main parties at the time. Responses
to the question ‘what would you say the Unionist Party stands for?’ saw
respondents identify the party with support for the union with Britain
(47 per cent) and defence of Protestant interests (16 per cent). In the case
of the Nationalist Party (the main voice of the Catholic community), the two
most cited images were support for a united Ireland (52 per cent) and
defence of Catholic interests (13 per cent). Respondents saw the Northern
Ireland Labour Party (a left-leaning, pro-union party that sought to avoid dis-
cussion of the ‘national question’) as a party of welfare socialism and the
working class (39 per cent) (Rose, 1971, pp. 223–233).
The context of Rose’s survey, conducted in an era of Protestant dominance
that was about to be challenged, and a stable dominant party system facing
two weak challengers, is strikingly diﬀerent from the current political world, in
which there is a much more even balance in the political resources available
to Catholics and Protestants and a multi-party party system with provisions for
power sharing. Nevertheless, there was a case for replicating Rose’s questions
about party images, and we did so in a survey of a representative sample of
the adult Northern Ireland population carried out in late 2015 and early 2016.6
Our questions took the following form:7
Thinking in general about the main political parties in Northern Ireland, can you
tell me what you think each of the parties stands for? Take the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) ﬁrst. What do you think the Democratic Unionist Party
stands for? Anything else?
[Subsequent questions appropriately adjusted were posed about the UUP, the Alli-
ance Party, the SDLP and Sinn Féin]
And the main parties in Britain…What do you think the Conservative Party
stands for? Anything else? [A similar question followed on the Labour Party]
And the main parties in Ireland … What do you think Fianna Fáil stands for?
Anything else? [Similar questions followed on Fine Gael and the Irish Labour party].
Responses as recorded by the interviewers varied greatly in length, from an
abrupt ‘no’ and a succinct ‘crap’ to a bitter 214-character critique of the
DUP’s fundamentalism and an enthusiastic 340-character commentary on
the British Labour Party. The minimum length of a response was two charac-
ters, the maximum 340 characters, with a median of 12 and a mean of 21. The
total length of responses, regarding all 10 parties, ranged from a minimum of
20, with several respondents simply responding ‘no’ to all 10 parties, to a
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maximum of 1,339 characters provided by one loquacious respondent
(median for all 10 responses, 166; mean, 213). The brevity of these responses,
and the often cryptic character of others, made coding difﬁcult, but reﬂected
the reality of respondents’ authentic reactions, calling for a number of rather
general descriptive categories.
Although respondents were prompted to give additional reactions, as indi-
cated in the question wording, it was possible in almost all cases to code
responses under the heading of a single descriptor. In only a few cases did
responses appear to imply a second perspective on the party, and in very
few was a third position identiﬁed. On further analysis, it appeared that
taking the second and third positions into account made virtually no diﬀer-
ence to the broad pattern. The analysis that follows is therefore based on
the primary position with which each party is identiﬁed (ignoring those
coded as second and third positions).8
In devising a coding frame to assess systematically how respondents
characterize the parties, we wished to distinguish between our three
themes of ethnonational, economic and moral-religious. Additionally, we
sought to identify those respondents who did not give any substantive
response (indicating that they did not know what the party stood for) and
also those respondents who indicated a substantive response that does not
fall into any of the three major domains mentioned above. Furthermore, to
enable more detailed analysis, we distinguished – as did Rose, and the
authors of the American Voter – between the ideological or policy aims of
parties on the one hand and how parties may be seen as representing the
interests of certain groups on the other. For example, a respondent may
describe a party in ethnonational terms and the response could either fall
into the ideological category (favours united Ireland / favours the union
with the UK) or the group representation one (represents Catholics / Protes-
tants). Similarly, a respondent may describe a party in economic terms, and
the coding could fall under either the ideological category (socialist beliefs /
right wing free market beliefs) or the group category (looks after the
working class / middle class). Additional nuanced measurement in our
coding frame facilitates breaking down the ideological characteristics
further by reference to strength of belief (for example, very strong or fairly
strong nationalist beliefs) and to group representation – the particular way
in which the group was described (for example, Catholics, nationalists, repub-
licans, or paramilitaries).
Devising a coding frame for the data was an iterative process. It included:
(1) initial examination of the data to provide a preliminary overview of the
responses,
(2) devising a provisional coding frame capturing diﬀerent themes and the
distinction between groups and ideas,
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(3) generation of the full set of nuanced categories,
(4) categorization of all 1,008 respondents’ descriptions of the 10 parties,
resulting in 10,080 coded units of analysis,
(5) synthesizing categories to produce a more coherent list of responses, and
(6) validation of our coding system by a blind parallel review by an indepen-
dent coder.
Ultimately, the large number of initial categories was reduced to 48, but as
some of these distinctions were unnecessary for purposes of analysis our
eﬀective number of categories was reduced to 35 (the full coding scheme
is described in the appendix).9
For the most part, classiﬁcation of responses was unproblematic, but three
categories require particular comment. First, an enormous number of respon-
dents expressed no view at all on what the parties stood for – an outcome
entirely compatible with what we have learned from the American Voter litera-
ture (see Figure 1 and discussion below), but surely a source of surprise and
dismay to democratic theorists. Typical responses in this category included
‘no comment’, ‘baﬄes me’, ‘haven’t a clue’, ‘heard of them but don’t know’,
Figure 1. Level of conceptualization of party images, USA 1956–2000 and Northern
Ireland, 2015–2016.
Source: Converse (1964); Knight (1980); Lewis-Beck et al. (2009, p. 279); Northern Ireland Assembly Election
Study: Party Images Survey (NIAES: PIS), 2015–2016.
Note: See appendix for coding system. Northern Ireland data refer to classiﬁcation of respondents regard-
ing their attitudes towards the ﬁve Northern Ireland parties (N = 1,008). For the relationship with class, chi-
square = 86, p < .001; for the relationship with voter versus non-voter, chi-square = 99, p < .001; for the
relationship with community background chi-square is not signiﬁcant.
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‘Dr Henry used to be my doctor’, ‘all of those are names, all these political
goals, life goes on’, but also included were such responses as an assessment
of the DUP as ‘they’ll not do a pile either; I’m not much into politics’, of the
UUP as ‘hard to say because they don’t know themselves’, and of the Alliance
Party as ‘insurance?’ (one of two responses that appeared to confuse the Alli-
ance Party with the insurance company Allianz).
Second, we placed a considerable number of respondents in the ‘general’
category: people who gave very diverse but unspeciﬁc (and usually quite
negative) responses, such as ‘load of rubbish’, ‘bunch of idiots’, ‘gangsters,
all about money and power’, ‘less said the better’, ‘none of them are any
good’, ‘self-serving’, ‘party in disarray’, ‘they’ve gone to the dogs’, and other
less printable judgements. A related general category was that in which
respondents associated a party with a leader rather than with a policy pos-
ition, such as ‘Hume sold them out’, or ‘Ian Paisley and that crowd’.
Third, we had anticipated that the moral-religious category would be of
considerable signiﬁcance, but it proved very diﬃcult to distinguish
between this category and related ethnonational positions. Thus, it is
clear that such assessments as ‘they go in for Christian things’, ‘good
values regarding abortion’ or ‘very religious’ fall into the moral-religious
category, but we have classiﬁed such comments as ‘staunchly Protestant
rights’, ‘another Protestant party’ or ‘Catholics’ under the ethnonational
heading, even though conceivably in some cases the respondent had in
mind religious principles rather than community identity. In adhering
here to the principle of consistency in coding, we may thus have been
attributing too few responses to the moral-religious category, but we are
satisﬁed that this is likely to have had only a marginal eﬀect, and in any
case we have little alternative.
Unfortunately, we were unable to code responses as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’
comprehensively. It was easy to identify about 2 per cent of responses as posi-
tive (for example, ‘helping people’ or ‘they are alright’), and about 11 per cent
as negative (for example, ‘bunch of twits’ or ‘dinosaurs that live; Jurassic Park
III’). In most cases, though, such classiﬁcation was impossible (for example, a
description of a party as standing for ‘big business’ might be either positive
or negative, as might even the description ‘middle of the road’). We were,
however, struck by the fact that it was so much easier to ﬁnd negative
rather than positive descriptions, and the vehemence of the distaste for
parties shared by many – a pattern in line with broader European trends
(Dalton & Weldon, 2005; Mair, 2013, pp. 2–7).
Comparing perceptions of parties
Before even looking at such ideological images of parties as emerge in the
words of respondents, it is important to assess their overall reaction to the
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parties and their capacity, or willingness, to categorize them. Figure 1 presents
a summary of the overall level of conceptualization used by respondents in
assessing parties, basing this as far as possible on the measurement instru-
ment used by the American Voter group. There are big diﬀerences between
the two approaches; the American project began with questions about
what respondents liked and disliked about the main parties, rather than the
more open-ended question on which our analysis is based. This important
diﬀerence, together with the very diﬀerent socio-economic and political cul-
tural proﬁle of Northern Ireland and the USA, makes the similarity in
ﬁndings between the two cases all the more remarkable.
The ﬁrst three bars in Figure 1 report the position at successive points in
time as reported in American studies, showing that the balance between
two more conceptually sophisticated groups as described above (ideologues
and near-ideologues, and those assessing parties by reference to group inter-
est) amount consistently to about half of the sample, with the remainder
divided between those showing little consciousness of any political matters
and those entirely unwilling or unable to provide a substantive response.
The fourth bar indicates the distribution of our Northern Ireland sample,
which shows a remarkable similarity to its contemporary US counterpart.
Here, respondents’ descriptions of each of the ﬁve Northern Ireland parties
were ﬁrst grouped into a four-point scale running from 0 (no issue content)
to 3 (ideologue or near-ideologue; see appendix); these were summed, to
form a 16-point ‘conceptualisation’ scale (running from 0 to 15); and this
scale was in turn recoded to produce four categories roughly matching
those of the American Voter.10
The remaining bars in Figure 1 show important contrasts between selected
groups regarding their levels of conceptualization. First, class matters: 66 per
cent of middle-class respondents compared with 40 per cent of working-class
respondents fall into the two higher levels of conceptualization, a ﬁnding com-
patible with research in the USA, where the important variable is not class as
such, but level of education, a variable not available to us. Second, level of pol-
itical commitment is important: 65 per cent of those naming a particular party
for which they would vote in a future election fell into the two higher cat-
egories, as opposed to 35 per cent of those saying that they would probably
not vote, that they were undecided, or who simply refused to answer –
another outcome in line with American ﬁndings.11 Finally, the last two bars con-
sider Northern Ireland’s major source of division, but suggest that there is little
diﬀerence between those of Protestant and Catholic backgrounds, with 55 per
cent of the former and 52 per cent of the latter falling into the two highest con-
ceptualization categories. Overall, these ﬁndings suggest that Northern Ireland
is by nomeans unusual from a comparative perspective when it comes to levels
of conceptualization of party images.
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We now turn to one of our central concerns: the extent to which party
images, where they oﬀer meaningful judgements on the parties at all,
reﬂect the three substantive policy orientations introduced earlier: the ethno-
national, socio-economic and moral-religious dimensions. We begin with a
comparison across the three polities of Northern Ireland, Great Britain and
the Republic of Ireland in exploring system-level diﬀerences in party
characterization.
The three sets of bars in Figure 2 refer in the ﬁrst place to three jurisdic-
tions: images of ﬁve parties in Northern Ireland, two in Great Britain and
three in the Republic (we assume that Northern Ireland respondents’
images of Sinn Féin, though it is organized on an all-Ireland basis, are con-
ditioned mainly by its role in Northern Ireland). The several categories are
grouped as described in the appendix, with substantive responses, whether
falling into the ideological or group interest categories, recategorized into
three groups of images: ethnonational, socio-economic and moral-religious.
Since it is important to test whether religious background matters, each of
the three clusters is broken into two bars, one based on Protestant respon-
dents, the other on Catholics.
0%
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40%
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70%
80%
90%
100%
Prot. Cath. Prot. Cath. Prot. Cath.
Northern Ireland Great Britain Republic of Ireland
ethnonational socio-economic not policy related  not described
Figure 2. Party images of Northern Irish, British and Irish parties by jurisdiction and
broad theme, by religious background, Northern Ireland, 2015–2016.
Source: NIAES: PIS, 2015–2016.
Note: See appendix for coding system. Religious background refers to current or childhood religion. The
bars refer to Protestant and Catholic respondents’ combined images of ﬁve parties in Northern Ireland, two
in Great Britain and three in the Republic of Ireland. The ‘moral-religious’ category is too small to be visible.
When this is omitted, for perceptions of Northern Ireland parties, chi-square = 34; for British parties, chi-
square = 16; for the Republic of Ireland parties, chi-square = 75; p < .001 in each case.
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The ﬁrst and most visible point to emerge from Figure 2 is the enormous
diﬀerence in perceptions of parties in the three jurisdictions. Respondents
had great diﬃculty making sense of the southern Irish parties, but were
able to describe their images of the two main British parties almost as well
as they were in the case of the Northern Ireland parties. This contrast is not
very surprising. After all, Northern Ireland operates within the UK system, is
exposed to British institutions and media, and participates in UK-wide elec-
tions. Furthermore, coalitions are relatively rare in the UK, so party brands
are likely to be clearer. As well as the prevalence of coalitions in the Republic
of Ireland, there has traditionally been limited ideological diﬀerence between
the parties, so discerning what exactly they stand for is a challenging task. In
fact, when a similar question was asked in the Republic 45 percent of respon-
dents were unable to say what Fine Gael, a major governing party, stood for
(Marsh, Sinnott, Garry, & Kennedy, 2008, p. 46).
Second, there is a huge diﬀerence between perceptions of the political
stance of the Northern Ireland parties and their British and Irish counterparts:
Northern Ireland parties are overwhelmingly seen as relating to the ethnona-
tional dimension, British ones to the socio-economic dimension, and Irish
parties, to the extent that respondents can present any image of them, as
socio-economic, but with some ethnonational colouring. In respect of the
British parties, it is easy to distinguish between group-centred and policy-
oriented positions, as indicated by such descriptors as ‘working class’ and
‘socialist’, or ‘middle class’ and ‘right-wing’. Not surprisingly, the Conservatives
are overwhelmingly seen as middle class and of the right, with Labour seen
almost as overwhelmingly as working class and of the left. As well as the
more general descriptors (such as ‘for poorer people’, or ‘more socialist’),
socio-economic responses for the Labour Party included ‘nationalise every-
thing’, ‘equality between the classes’, and ‘get oﬀ the rich and give it to the
poor’. For the Conservative Party, responses were often bitter and dismissive,
including ‘posh boys’, ‘cuts, cuts, cuts’, ‘for the rich and keeping the poor
down’, ‘more for the more well-oﬀ people’, and ‘capitalism unfettered’.
Irish parties, as we have seen, present a particular diﬃculty. One respon-
dent exclaimed ‘I don’t even follow the ones in Northern Ireland never
mind the ones down south’. Fianna Fáil was predictably puzzling, attracting
such responses as ‘unprincipled; no kind words’, ‘party of freedom’; ‘a pack
of crooks’, ‘for the people of Ireland’, and ‘they are running scared of Sinn
Féin’. Fine Gael fared a little better; few were able to categorize it at all, but
those who did were less critical than in the case of Fianna Fáil: ‘more conser-
vative, Catholic orientated’, ‘moderate nationalism, greater empathy with UK
and NI’ or ‘middle of the road nationalist’. Only the smallest of the three
parties, Labour, evoked a more clear-cut ideological response, with many
seeing it as representing working class or left-wing interests, though often
vaguely (such as ‘not sure but probably working-class values’, ‘similar to the
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British one’, or ‘ordinary man’). Very few respondents directly mentioned
moral-religious issues (such as abortion, or gay rights) when describing the
parties in any of the three polities – a surprising outcome in the Northern
Ireland case, to which we will return.
Finally, since Figure 2 breaks down the data by religious background of the
respondent we have material to compare the position of the two commu-
nities. In fact, there are few diﬀerences, but there is one striking exception:
the tendency for Protestants to be much more likely than Catholics to
respond ‘don’t know’ regarding Irish parties, suggesting greater Catholic inter-
est in and knowledge of the politics of the Republic. By contrast, Catholics are
only a little more likely than Protestants to respond ‘don’t know’ to Northern
Irish and British parties.
Images of Northern Ireland parties
We now focus in more detail on how the Northern Ireland parties compare
with each other in respect of their public images. We move from the more
general to the more speciﬁc, using three tables. First, Table 1 reorganizes
the data presented in Figure 2 in relation to the ﬁve main Northern Ireland
parties. The two most conceptually advanced categories – ideological and
near-ideological, and ‘group interest’ responses – are merged, and then
broken down into three policy dimensions: ethnonational, socio-economic
and moral-religious. The ‘not policy related’ and ‘position not described’ cat-
egories refer to images that correspond with the ‘nature of the times’ and ‘no
issue content’ respondents.
Some fascinating points emerge immediately from Table 1. The ﬁrst is the
barely perceptible impact of the moral-religious dimension (though, as indi-
cated above, it is possible that this dimension is slightly under-reported).
This ﬁnding is unexpected, given the long-recognized importance of religion
in public life in Northern Ireland and its role not just in the formation of eth-
nonational identity but also in promoting certain types of politico-religious
activism (Ganiel & Dixon, 2008; Mitchell, 2006, pp. 91–132). Yet only 3 per
Table 1. Party images of individual Northern Irish parties by broad theme, 2015–2016.
DUP
(%)
UUP
(%)
APNI
(%)
SDLP
(%)
SF
(%)
All
(%)
Ethnonational 43.2 40.0 43.7 34.9 50.6 42.5
Socio-economic 3.0 3.8 2.1 9.6 4.5 4.6
Moral-religious 2.9 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.9
Not policy related 19.8 19.7 9.4 16.2 15.7 16.2
Position not described 31.2 36.1 44.7 39.1 28.5 35.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of cases 1,008 100.0 1,008 1,008 1,008 5,040
Notes: See appendix for coding system. Chi-square = 461, p < .001.
Source: NIAES: PIS, 2015–2016.
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cent of images of the DUP were classiﬁed as falling into this category, and vir-
tually none in the case of the other parties.
Second, there is considerable asymmetry in respondents’ characterizations
of the main unionist and nationalist parties. Observers of Northern Ireland
typically assume that the DUP and Sinn Féin are the most ‘hard-line’ represen-
tatives of unionism and nationalism respectively, with the UUP and the SDLP
adopting more moderate positions within their respective blocs. No such clear
pattern emerges from our respondents’ assessments: the DUP and UUP are
characterized in very similar ways, whereas Sinn Féin and the SDLP are seen
as very diﬀerent. As the table shows, there is just a three percentage point
diﬀerence between the DUP and UUP regarding the proportion of party
characterizations that are ethnonational; by contrast, just over one third of
SDLP but fully half of Sinn Féin descriptions fall into this category. When
broken down by religious background, these diﬀerences remain: 38 per
cent of Protestants and 33 per cent of Catholics categorize the SDLP as ethno-
national, while the respective proportions for Sinn Féin are 54 per cent and 48
per cent.
Third, notwithstanding its vintage status – it was founded in 1970 – and high
media proﬁle, the Alliance Party seems to have presented a particular challenge
to the respondents, with 45 per cent not oﬀering any description of the party at
all. In addition to more blunt expressions of indiﬀerence or absence of knowl-
edge, such agnostic responses included some that were relatively positive (such
as ‘best of a bad job’, ‘trying to help the public’ or ‘well intentioned’), some
negative (‘change their mind every two minutes; don’t know what they do’,
‘they ﬁght among themselves’, ‘I ﬁnd it hard to believe anything that they
say’), or simply puzzled (‘are they like the Greens?’, ‘Chinese? Ethnics, not just
Chinese, but all of them?’, ‘Going by the name it is a united party’).
We explore further the signiﬁcance of the dominant ‘ethnonational’ label in
Table 2. This breaks down the ﬁrst row of Table 1 into four categories, two
relating to the two main communities and their associated ideologies, an
intermediate ‘cross-community’ category (where a party, even if it stood for
transcending the ethnonational division, was deﬁned by reference to that),
Table 2. Ethnonational descriptions by type and party, Northern Ireland, 2015–2016.
DUP
(%)
UUP
(%)
APNI
(%)
SDLP
(%)
SF
(%)
All
(%)
Protestants, unionism 84.1 89.3 3.6 1.1 0.0 34.9
Cross-community 2.5 5.5 93.6 30.7 2.4 26.4
Catholics, nationalism 0.5 0.0 1.6 63.6 89.6 32.2
General ethnonational 12.9 5.2 1.1 4.5 8.0 6.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of cases 435 403 440 352 510 2,140
Notes: The table refers only to the ethnonational category in Table 1. See appendix for coding system. Chi-
square = 3,164, p < .001.
Source: NIAES: PIS, 2015–2016.
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and a residual ‘general ethnonational’ category. The last of these includes
diverse judgements, such as ‘bigoted’, ‘enemy of Ulster’, ‘noise, shouting,
tribal politics’, and ‘sold out Ulster’, and was particularly prominent in judge-
ments of the DUP. The general implications of the table are predictable, with
one exception. The DUP and the Ulster Unionists are obviously associated
with Protestant or unionist people and ideology, Sinn Féin with Catholic or
nationalist people and ideology, and Alliance with an inclusive, bridge-build-
ing role. But the SDLP’s position is unusual, and it departs sharply from Sinn
Féin: only 64 per cent of our respondents saw it as identiﬁed with one com-
munity, while 31 per cent (36 per cent of Catholics and 27 per cent of Protes-
tants) saw it as essentially cross-community, a remarkable result.
Table 3 examines the kinds of ethnonational labels that have been grouped
in the discussion above more closely; it includes the ﬁrst three rows of Table 2,
dropping the ‘general ethnonational’ one. Two of these three rows, referring to
the two main communities and their associated ideologies, are further
Table 3. Ethnonational descriptions by detailed type and party, Northern Ireland, 2015–
2016.
DUP
(%)
UUP
(%)
APNI
(%)
SDLP
(%)
SF
(%)
All
(%)
Protestants, unionism
Protestant community group
Protestants 17.4 12.8 0.9 0.6 0.0 6.0
Unionists 6.9 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2
Loyalists 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Paramilitaries (UDA, UVF etc.) 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Subtotal 24.8 23.3 0.9 0.6 0.0 9.3
Unionist policy
Strong unionist 7.7 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9
Moderate unionist 0.0 9.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.9
Unionist (general) 58.8 56.0 2.3 0.6 0.0 22.1
Loyalist 5.3 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
Subtotal 71.8 70.9 2.8 0.6 0.0 27.3
Cross-community 2.9 5.8 94.7 32.1 2.6 27.2
Catholics, nationalism
Catholic community group
Catholics 0.3 0.0 0.0 14.6 13.6 5.5
Nationalists 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.7 7.7 2.7
Republicans 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.3
Paramilitaries (IRA, etc.) 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 4.7 1.1
Subtotal 0.3 0.0 0.2 20.2 27.5 9.7
Nationalist policy
Strong nationalist 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.4
Moderate nationalist 0.0 0.0 0.5 18.2 0.6 3.4
Nationalist (general) 0.3 0.0 0.9 24.4 48.8 16.8
Republican 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 18.8 6.0
Subtotal 0.3 0.0 1.4 46.4 69.9 26.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
No. of cases 379 382 435 336 469 2,001
Notes: The table refers only to the ﬁrst three categories in Table 2. Each subtotal is broken down into the
percentages in italics.
Source: NIAES: PIS, 2015–2016.
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subdivided, ﬁrst on the basis of whether the images appear to be group- or
policy related, and then regardingmore reﬁned terminology. The most interest-
ing contrasts are between the top left and the bottom right quadrants. There is
hardly any perceived association of the unionist parties with paramilitary
groups, and the label ‘loyalist’ is sparingly used; by contrast, there is a stronger
association of Sinn Féin with the IRA (5 per cent) and with the label ‘republican’
(19 per cent). The Ulster Unionist Party is much more likely to be described as
‘moderate’ (10 per cent) than the DUP (0 per cent), and this is matched on the
nationalist side, where the SDLP is described as ‘moderate’ (18 per cent) but
Sinn Féin is not (less than 1 per cent). However, the fact that so many descrip-
tions of the SDLP fall into the ‘cross-community’ category highlights the asym-
metry in the relationship between the two large parties within either bloc. There
is no evidence here, though, of anything analogous to the fascinating contrast
uncovered in American research between ‘ideological republicans and group
interest democrats’ (Grossman & Hopkins, 2015).
Conclusion
Our general ﬁndings from the dataset may now be summarized. At the most
fundamental level, Northern Ireland respondents reacted to questions about
what parties stand for in much the same way as respondents elsewhere, and
particularly in the USA, where most research in this area has been concen-
trated. About half do not describe the parties in any politically relevant way,
whether because they are entirely unwilling or unable to do so, or because
their responses show little or no recognition of the parties as political entities.
Among those who provide meaningful assessments of party positions,
whether regarding policy or by relation to the groups with which they are
seen to be associated, Northern Ireland respondents characterize their own
parties almost entirely in ethnonational terms, and British parties in socio-
economic terms. However, they – and particularly Protestants among them
– have considerable diﬃculty in describing parties in the Republic at all.
There is also an intriguing asymmetry with respect to how respondents
describe the Northern Ireland parties. Contrary to the commonplace charac-
terization of the DUP and Sinn Féin as ‘hard-line’ or ‘extreme’ and the Ulster
Unionist Party and SDLP as ‘moderate’, there appear to be only marginal
diﬀerences in how the two main unionist parties are described, but a much
sharper contrast between the images of the two nationalist parties, perhaps
a legacy of the conﬂict, in which Sinn Féin was was the political partner of
the IRA. Furthermore, ideas appear to be more important than groups
when respondents characterize what parties stand for. There are elements
of symmetry between the two main political blocs, but with an important
exception: the SDLP emerges as being diﬀerent from the DUP, the Ulster
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Unionists and Sinn Féin, in that it is much more likely to be characterized as a
‘cross-community’ party.
These ﬁndings, based on a systematic quantitative and qualitative analysis
of a representative sample, provide novel insights into how Northern Ireland
respondents mentally navigate and characterize the core parties in their
system. Northern Ireland respondents have the capacity to assess the
parties in Great Britain through a non-ethnonational lens, and do not univer-
sally view matters through an ethnonational prism (though this was dominant
in their assessments of the Northern Ireland parties). They are not greatly
diﬀerent from their counterparts elsewhere in their capacity to oﬀer a mean-
ingful categorization of the political positions of the parties – that is, about
half appear to show no capacity to do so. But there may be a positive side
to such apparent indiﬀerence to party images: party leaders may have a
freer hand to conduct political business, since a large section of the electorate
eﬀectively opts out of judging them. But, over time, there is little evidence of
fundamental change. A half-century after the civil unrest began, the con-
clusion reached about party images on the basis of the 1968 loyalty survey
remains valid: ‘collectively, Protestants and Catholics agree about what the
major parties stand for’ (Rose, 1971, p. 234).
Notes
1. In 2001, three Alliance Party members of the Assembly brieﬂy self-designated as
‘unionist’ for tactical reasons.
2. These diﬀerences are more pronounced on the Catholic side (Coakley, 2008, pp.
776–784). For brief overviews of the origins of the parties see Evans & Duﬀy
(1997) and McAllister (1983).
3. In fact, the 2017 UK general election saw the end of SDLP and Ulster Unionist
representation in the House of Commons, where Northern Ireland represen-
tation is currently conﬁned to the DUP, Sinn Féin and one independent unionist.
4. In one earlier intervention, Fianna Fáil leader Éamon de Valera was elected to the
Northern Ireland House of Commons in 1933 on an abstentionist platform
(Elliott, 1973, p. 72).
5. The ﬁrst survey research in Northern Ireland was carried out by Ian Budge and
Cornelius O’Leary in 1967, but was conﬁned to Belfast; see Budge & O’Leary
(1973).
6. In all, 1,008 interviews were conducted with a representative sample of the
population of Northern Ireland aged 16 and over, using two-stage quota-
based sampling (selection of geographical points, and selection of respondents
within geographical points). Forty-ﬁve sampling points were chosen at random
from 285 electoral wards, and quotas were set to ensure that the sample was
representative in respect of age, gender and social class based on the latest
census estimates. All interviewing was conducted face-to-face using Computer
Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI). Interviewing was conducted in-home,
between 17 November 2015 and 18 January 2016.
7. Despite an exhaustive bibliographical and data search and extensive queries to
colleagues, we were unable to ﬁnd any examples of this kind of wording in any
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other major survey, apart from the Irish National Election Study of 2002 (Marsh
et al., 2008). Richard Rose reports that Philip Converse had failed to get this ques-
tion included in the 1968 American National Election Survey, and in a similar
French survey, suggesting a path-dependent explanation for its exclusion
then and later (email from Richard Rose to John Coakley, 7 November 2016).
8. Since there were 1,008 respondents, each of whom was questioned about 10
parties, and we saw non-responses, ‘don’t knows’ and refusals as substantively
signiﬁcant, we recorded a total of 10,080 primary positions, but only 457
second positions (4.5%) and 35 third positions (0.3%). We tried to take
account of these (1) by adding the second and third positions to the ﬁrst pos-
itions (to give us a total of 10,572 party images) and (2) by similarly adding
these, but adjusting them by a weighting factor (1 for single responses, 0.5
for double responses and 0.33 for triple responses). The resulting distribution
of labels made almost no diﬀerence; the Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient
between each of these amended distributions and the original was 1.000.
9. We began by devising a coding frame on the basis of intensive discussion, and
then attempting to apply this as consistently as possible. To test the robustness
of our coding decisions we invited a post-doctoral researcher specialising in
Northern Ireland politics to familiarise himself with our coding scheme and its
implementation, illustrating this by our practice in respect of 1,000 randomly
selected responses. We then selected a further 1,000 of our 10,080 responses
at random and presented these to the new coder (this time without indicating
our coding decisions), and he coded them blind. There was a very high level of
agreement between the new coder and the original group in respect of the 35
eﬀective categories (the coder’s categorization was identical to ours in 88.7% of
cases). We tested the relationship between the new and original codes using
Krippendorﬀ’s Alpha, which yielded a coeﬃcient of 0.84, comfortably above
the level of 0.80 that is conventionally seen as the cut-oﬀ for a high level of
reliability (see Hayes & Krippendorﬀ, 2007).
10. The 16-point scale was recoded by grouping categories 0–2, 3–7, 8–12 and 13–
15. While a large number of respondents showed consistency in their level of
conceptualization across parties (for example, all without issue content, or all
at ideological level), many of the categories reported here are of course
hybrid: a respondent originally coded 0 in respect of two parties, 2 in respect
of two more, and 1 in respect of the ﬁfth would be coded as 1 (‘nature of the
times’).
11. American research shows the great importance of education and degree of pol-
itical knowledge and interest in determining level of conceptual sophistication
(Knight, 1985, p. 838). We have treated social grade as an approximate surrogate
of education, a variable that was not available to us. Instead of political interest
and knowledge, we have used disposition to vote (1 = will vote for named party
at next election, 0 = will not vote, other response). Regression analysis involving
these and a range of demographic variables suggests that position on the 16-
point ‘conceptualisation’ scale can be explained to some degree by a number
of demographic variables: social grade (high), age (old), sex (male), region
(greater Belfast) and home ownership (owned, not rented); R2 = 0.22. When
account is taken of these variables, the intention to vote variable is not a signiﬁ-
cant predictor.
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Appendix: Coding frame for party image data.
Descriptor No. of cases
120-no substantive response 4,970
000-indeterminate response 12
100-no response 405
101-don’t know 3,633
104-no opinion 157
105-don’t care 50
107-no interest in politics 236
109-uncertain 313
110-have not heard of party 80
111-have heard of party (but don’t know what they stand for) 40
112-don’t understand politics: general 4
113-don’t understand ROI politics 30
114-don’t understand GB politics 4
115-don’t understand the party in question 6
202-protestants 126
205-unionists 66
208-loyalists 2
211-paramilitaries (UDA, UVF etc.) 1
213-strong unionist 39
217-moderate unionist 40
219-unionist: general 462
223-loyalist 30
(Continued )
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Appendix: Continued.
Descriptor No. of cases
226-cross-community/centrist (non-sectarian) 569
227-catholics 116
231-nationalists 57
235-republicans 7
237-paramilitaries (IRA etc.) 24
241-strong nationalist 8
244-moderate nationalist 71
246-nationalist: general 352
249-republican 125
251-general ethnonational 145
302-underclass: very poor 3
303-working class: poor 399
307-socialism/socialist(s) 108
309-economic left 101
314-centrist (socio-economic) 6
315-middle class: rich 151
319-upper class: very rich 67
323-extreme economic right 1
324-economic right 198
400-liberal, secular 16
406-christian fundamentalist 24
409-socially conservative 11
500-ideological general (right) 161
503-ideological general (left) 121
507-ideological general (centrist) 37
700-general 1,466
509-general 1,332
600-associated with leader/individual (past/present) 134
Total 10,080
Grouping of data
Figure 1
No issue content 000–115
Nature of the times’ 509, 600
Group interest 202–211, 227–237, 302–303, 315–319
Ideologue, near-ideologue 213–226, 241–251, 307–314, 323–507
Figure 2, Table 1
Ethnonational 202–251
Socio-economic 302–324, 500–507
Moral-religious 400–409
Not policy related 509–600
Position not described 000–115
Table 2
Protestants, unionism 202–223
Cross-community 226
Catholics, nationalism 227–249
General ethnonational 251
Table 3
Based on values 202–249
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